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The workshop format involved an opening presentation by Cliff Rus-
sell to establish the most important economic issues related to resource
based interregional  conflict.  Cliff did not prepare  a paper specifically
for the workshop,  but referred  to his earlier writing on the topic.  In
particular,  he relied  on a paper "Externality,  Conflict  and Decision,"
which  is  published  as  a  chapter  of the  recent  RFF  book,  Regional
Conflict and National  Policy (1982). The workshop reached no consen-
sus,  nor was  one attempted.  The  following points were developed  by
Russell and the workshop participants.
Sources  of Regional  Conflict
The roots of regional resource conflict are clearly in the non-uniform
distribution  of physical  resources  among  different  parts  of the  U.S.
These resources provide a key part of an area's competitive advantage.
Familiar  labels  like  "sun belt,"  "bread  basket,"  "parch  belt,"  "frost
belt," are tossed out by writers and promoters to tout an area's physical
attributes  or to taunt an area for its lack.
Resource endowments define the character of a region, a major basis
by which one area is distinguished from another. Garreau in his recent
book The Nine Nations of North America, gives prominent mention to
resources as the basis for regional  definition. The energy crisis of the
1970s added further emphasis to resource differences.  A popular bumper
sticker  on cars  in  energy  rich sun-belt  states  during  the late  1970s
taunted, "Let the Bastards Freeze in the Dark." Thousands of residents
of northern  states joined the parade to southern  climates  where  the
living was easy.  The retort from the Midwest - "Soil for Oil!"
The point  is that regional  resource differences  do exist and are  in-
creasingly part of the popular culture.  They are a major component of
economic  differences,  as resources  are  converted  to income  and jobs,
and their absence may require considerable import cost. Any regional
differences  are the basis for  trade.  Artificial  scarcity  of hydrocarbon
fuels in the 1970s  seems to have  tipped the regional balance  of trade,
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179exaggerated the importance of resource  endowments,  and encouraged
people to  move to  energy rich areas.
Even  after the energy  crisis, resource  characteristics  appear to  be
increasingly  important to a region's  economic  and political character.
To  Montanans,  economic  development  means  coal  development  and
rules to  keep  the  coal  revenue  in  Montana.  Governors  of the Great
Lakes states have met frequently to  explore ways to capitalize  on the
image  and  substance  of the  lakes,  and  to present  a united  front  to
other regions.  Greater concentration in food production  gives new ad-
vantage to those who manage the soils and water of the  grain belt.
In addition to the general  comparative  economic  advantage  aspect
of regional  resource  differences  is  the  physical  externality  aspect of
resource use. Coal burning in the industrial centers of the mid-Atlan-
tic  states is creating  environmental  problems in northern  New Eng-
land,  the upper  Great Lakes and several provinces  of Canada.  There
are regional  resource  conflicts,  as well.  Oil shortages led to increased
coal burning, including some of the high sulphur variety that produces
noxious and dangerous air pollution.
National  air quality  standards  produced  higher  and higher  smoke
stacks  at the power  plants  to get the waste gases  up  and out of the
local  area.  Good intentions there have  produced  acid  rain in regions
hundreds  of miles from the pollution  source.
Why Government  Action?
We have regional resource  conflict - so what? Does the obvious fact
that there are  externality  problems among  regions necessarily mean
that  some  government  action  is  called  for?  Can  or  should  all  such
conflict  be resolved?  Even if we agree that  some  government  should
respond,  which government is appropriate and how should it respond?
What  are  the basic criteria  under  which government  action  may  be
appropriate?  Economics  gives some guidance on this question, though
is  obviously not  a sufficient  guide  to  public  action.  Some  attempt to
understand  the sources  or  nature  of interregional  conflict  can  help.
Regional  externalities  (conflicts)  may be pecuniary,  real  physical  in-
teractions,  or political.  Rationale  for and nature of governmental  ac-
tions differ by type of externality.
Pecuniary:  Economists  frequently  argue  that "mere pecuniary  ex-
ternalities" are inadequate bases for public action. They simply signal
market interactions as when a competing source of supply drives down
the price  an existing  firm can  charge for its product. Such efforts  are
the stuff of economic  growth and change.  Relative prices  and capital-
ization of asset values  simply lead the market economy  in new direc-
tions. Examples  are the influence of western irrigated acreage on the
price  of eastern cotton  and establishment  of a mainland  macadamia
nut industry that may depress the price of the Hawaiian version.
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ever, since federal water and farm policies have facilitated and some-
times created western production. To attempt to resolve such regional
resource  conflict  by publicly  altering the terms  of trade in  any  way
might block  economic  adjustments  that reflect valid  shifts of tastes
and preferences.  Adjustments to pecuniary externalities  are made  by
mobile firms and individuals responding to price signals. The general
proposition  is that pecuniary externalities  take care of themselves  as
firms and individuals shift locations  and activities.
For example people in  a particular  region may be  satisfied with a
lower level of environmental quality than people elsewhere are willing
to tolerate.  This is a regional  difference.  People and firms may select
the combination of environmental  quality, money  wages,  and cost  of
living offered  by different states  or regions.  If a "low quality"  region
loses  too  many  skilled  people  seeking  a cleaner  living environment,
firms may  follow  despite lower operating  costs often associated with
lower environmental  standards.
Residents  of a region capture  a portion of the economic  rents asso-
ciated with the unique resource endowment of that region. Massachu-
setts residents-pay  dearly  for  the fuel  oil  or  coal  produced  in other
regions. Montanans may affect the price by charging a high severance
tax designed to retain economic rent from coal within the state bound-
aries. There  is only so much rent available  from Montana  coal in the
energy market. The high severance tax just keeps more  of it in Mon-
tana. Further,  no one  is forced  to live  in Massachusetts.  They  do  so
for many reasons, including the unique natural  amenity of Cape Cod
and  proximity  to  glorious  mountains  of  northern  New  England.  If
Montanans want to capture coal rents, let them do  so. There is  little
reason for government to get in the way.
The logic against government corrections of pecuniary externalities
assumes that markets can in fact adjust. A natural or legal monopolist
could  clearly  exploit  the  system.  If Montana  were  the  only  energy
source, some protection of "the public good" would likely be necessary.
Some  states  have  created  barriers  to  entry  by  outside  firms,  thus
thwarting the adjustment process. Many  poor people cannot  afford to
move,  thus  the  forces  of market  adjustment  may  consistently  hurt
some  people.  Equity  concerns  also must  be taken  into  account.  But
there is a real question  as to whether  government  should sustain  a
particular population  in an uneconomic environment, merely because
that group refuses to respond to market signals.
Obviously,  many of the regional  resource  conflicts discussed  above
are pecuniary in nature.  Beyond the clear distortions of market control
and problems of those people who lack basic response capability, many
argue that government  has no business tampering  with the market
adjustments that will inevitably occur.
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dismiss this  source  of conflict  as easily  as pecuniary  effects.  It com-
monly  is  accepted  that real externalities  (nearly  always)  are  proper
matters for collective decision and action. Pollution of various types is
the most common  example,  where  actions  by individuals  or firms  in
one region  impose  costs  or constrain alternatives  for those  in others,
through direct, real  physical impact. Agricultural  erosion and run-off
may reduce  productivity  of the farmer's land. That  should perhaps be
the farmer's  problem  - he/she  can  protect  his  interest with invest-
ment in conservation.  But when the  soil enters a stream  and creates
a problem for a fisherman or community downstream,  that is another
matter.
The farmer has no clear incentive to help out the downstream water
user;  government  action  is necessary  if the  conflict  is to be  resolved.
The  similar conditions  apply  when  acid rain is  the  conflict,  and  dif-
ferent  regions  are  involved.  The  real  externality  implies  an  ineffi-
ciency  in that too  much of a  "bad"  or too  little of a "good"  is  being
produced,  given  impacts  on  people  not involved  in  the transaction.
Thus government should correct for the inefficiency with public action.
Decentralized  bargaining  among  private  firms or individuals  cannot
be counted upon to solve  the problem.
Alternatives  for  government  action  to  resolve  these  interregional
conflicts based on real  resource externalities  include establishment  of
special  organizations  to  facilitate  bargaining,  imposition  of regula-
tions,  levying  a  tax  on the  firm  producing  an  external  "bad"  or an
incentive  for the firm producing  too little of a good thing.
A frequently cited example of regional bargaining is the multi-state
river basin commission.  The river basin  is a physical  entity that  en-
compasses  certain  economic  interrelationships.  Those who  cause  pol-
lution  and  those  damaged  by  it  are  usually  contained  within  its
boundaries. But claims of success for these regional units are generally
overdrawn.  "Problem  sheds"  are  difficult  to  define,  particularly  for
resource  issues like air pollution.
Pathways  for pollutants  causing  acid rain  are poorly  defined.  The
U.S.  - Canada International  Joint Commission  is concerned  primarily
with water quality in the Great Lakes, though its mission could  con-
ceivably be expanded to focus on the bi-national dimension of acid rain.
There  is  real  conflict  on this matter,  and some  basis on  which  to ad-
dress the  issue is needed.
Courts  are  an alternative  means for  regional  resource  conflict  res-
olution.  But there  are  problems.  One  is that  few judges understand
the  technical  details  of the  conflict.  Court  procedures  often  depend
upon  delay which  may  become  a  de facto decision to  let the problem
continue.  The Supreme Court is reluctant to get involved in this type
of inter-state problem.
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decisions, and continue because political boundaries separate the com-
batants. The exclusionary power ofjurisdictional boundaries may keep
interested parties  from having a voice in political  decisions  and thus
create regional resource conflicts  out of differences  in tastes.
For example, federal tax codes, public credit sources, and direct pub-
lic incentives have  made  irrigated agriculture  attractive in some dry
regions of the Great Plains.  Resource  decisions  in that region  affect
water supplies available  hundreds of miles away, create wind erosion
felt in nearby states and have a pecuniary effect on crops grown else-
where without public subsidy.
Governors of the Great Lakes states have joined forces to discourage
and prohibit if possible diversion of water from the Great Lakes to the
"Parch Belt." Thus, political  action causes or at least exacerbates  re-
gional  conflict  on  this point,  and  others  like  it,  by  sharpening  the
issues before they emerge on their own.
Policy  Implications
Several  policy conclusions  emerge.  First,  the nation must  develop
better  ways to relieve  the short run pain  associated  with pecuniary
externalities.  Resources, including human and financial, must be able
to respond to economic opportunities but the side-effects of the adjust-
ments may represent valid bases for public action. People  can be hurt
when  a change in technology or world economy  renders  a way of life
obsolete.  The fact that such adjustments  are inevitable  in a dynamic
economy  is cold comfort to those affected.
We  should  not  attempt  to divert  the  adjustments,  nor  should  we
ignore their human consequences.  This is particularly true when gov-
ernments have actually created  an artificial  regional advantage that
will be allowed to deteriorate.  The public  subsidy of irrigated agricul-
ture in dry regions is  a case in point. Water shortage  or a change  in
water allocation rules could leave these farmers high and dry, to use
a bad pun.
Michigan's  auto  industry  has  argued for  domestic  content  legisla-
tion, tariffs, import restrictions, and voluntary import quotas to lessen
the pecuniary  effect  of technology  and labor  practices  in Japan  that
permit production of a better product at lower cost. Artificial barriers
to trade would produce inefficencies, yet the short term discomfort for
Michigan auto workers cannot be ignored.
Most of the regional  resource differences  that produce  conflicts dis-
cussed  above  are  in  fact pecuniary  in nature,  thus  not a matter  for
government  intervention.  To  attempt to alter the fact that Montana
has coal that the eastern states must have, or that the Midwest has a
significant  economic advantage for food production would be frustrat-
ing, at best.
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iorate the side effects, not attempt  to hold back the tide of change.  To
do so could harm consumers  for many  generations to  come.
If real externalities  are to  be reduced,  government  action  is essen-
tial. There is little likelihood that private adjustments will solve these
problems.  There  is little incentive  for the firm  imposing the external
cost to bargain with those bearing the harm,  so long as property rights
are clear. If those harmed could  get together and bribe the polluter to
stop polluting and still come out  ahead, then private  solutions might
work.  The  information  and transaction  costs  involved  usually  make
these solutions impossible.
Choice  among  alternative  policy  instruments  to resolve  the  exter-
nality implies a distribution of burden among participants.  A soil loss
regulation,  for example,  implies that downstream  users have a right
to  clean  water,  and  that  the  farmer  must  do  whatever  it  takes  to
eliminate  the problem.  A volunteer  cost-sharing  incentive,  on the other
hand,  implies  the  farmers  have  the  right to  erode  along  with  other
land ownership rights. Policy options are selected based on the various
consequences  involved.
Implications  for Extension  Policy  Education
Policy education  can  focus  on these alternatives,  including expres-
sion of preference  or judgment by the educator as to which alternatives
show particular  promise.  Decision  makers  and  others  need  to  have
definitive,  defensible  information  on  the  economic  and political  con-
sequence  of different ways  to solve the regional externality problems.
Distribution  of impact is  often more  critical than  the nature  of that
impact.
Beyond this alternative-consequence  stuff, policy educators can help
clarify the nature  of the interregional  resource  conflict.  Is it largely
pecuniary,  or  are  there real  technical  bases  involved?  How  has gov-
ernment  action  created  the  problem?  Whose  interests  are  at  stake?
What information  needs are there? Is there really much utility in the
distinctions  among  types of externality,  or is the real  issue to  deter-
mine  whose preferences  make  a difference  in the decision?
It could be, for example,  that some conflicts  that appear to be "merely
pecuniary,"  impose burdens deemed unacceptable by those with access
to  political  power.  To  simply  write these  problems  off as  irrelevant
would  be  risky,  and  probably  costly.  By  the  same  token,  some  real
externalities  generate  little interest among  those affected.  The right
and  capacity  to have  one's  interests  considered  may  not respect  the
economists'  proclivity  for  granting  more  legitimacy  to  some  policy
problems than to others.
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The primary topics  of discussion  among workshop participants,  in-
cluding  Dr.  Russell,  concerned  the conceptual  framework  for under-
standing or recommending  public policy for regional resource conflicts.
The substantive  details  of current resource  conflicts received  far less
attention.  The following points were raised:
1.  The neoclassical  economic  construct  of market failure/remedy may
be unnecessarily  restricting to a discussion  of policy  in any  area, in-
cluding regional resource conflict. To imply that our theory constitutes
adequate  or even necessary basis for  supporting  public action  in one
case or resisting it in another may be imposing too great a burden on
the theory.  Policies  are undertaken  for  a  variety  of reasons  usually
associated with compelling evidence  by those whose intents are dam-
aged or insufficiently  sustained that some changes in the current  set
of rules would be in "the public interest."
The market failure/remedy  paradigm  may be a useful  construct to
help understand the nature of the policy problem and the set of policy
choices.  But it has little normative  validity in terms of what  should
happen,  where  and when.  Economics  as a  discipline  and set of ana-
lytics can help sort out the positive and negative impacts of alternative
policy actions  as well as whose interests  are damaged  and whose  ex-
panded.  Policy  choices are  then made  among those options  based  on
perceived validity  or relevance  of those observed impacts.
The  policy economist  should not  allow himself or herself to  be  as-
signed only the uninteresting chore of defining externalities.  The really
interesting activity concerns  the perception  of economic  consequence
by those whose preferences  count and subsequent battles over what to
do  about the "problem."  The economist  should not be intimidated  by
his/her discipline.  We have insights to offer on the nature of problems
and consequence  of solutions,  insights  that just  may  be better  than
those of other analysts.
2.  The  economist  has a clear  professional obligation  to clarify  the
efficiency  consequences  of different  policy proposals.  Some  proposals
are  simply  bad policy.  They  substitute  expensive  bureaucratic  rules
for the relatively inexpensive  functioning of a market. Many govern-
ment  interventions  create  costly  disruptions in markets,  disruptions
that create  more problems than they solve.  Economists  are in a good
position, because of their professional training, to provide greater scru-
tiny of proposed market interventions to help assure that the long term
net effect on citizens and taxpayers  is positive. Too often governments
have let good intentions replace good policy with results that are dam-
aging to everyone.
This is particularly  notable  in cases of pecuniary externality where
government  provides  incentives  to certain businesses  in the name  of
economic development  or protecting the small farm or some other laud-
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is created, suggesting that these enterprises  are in the public interest
and therefore should survive. Many do not in the longer run, at great
cost to taxpayers and unrealized expectations by all involved. Econom-
ics  and  economists  can  be  the source  of critical  scrutiny  the  system
needs.  Let's earn the label dismal science.
3.  The conclusion that government should always be less concerned
about pecuniary than real externalities  involves an underlying value
judgment which  should  be  made  explicit:  it will  tend to  favor  those
with existing  control  over  resources  (property  rights)  or with the  fi-
nancial  wherewithall  to establish  and protect  such control.  This rec-
ommendation  also is unrealistic in that it ignores the  necessary  and
proper  (and inevitable)  role of government  involvement  when issues
arise from conflict over rights or distribution  of externalities.
Finally, the recommendation  ignores  the  fact  that even  if market
solutions are politically preferable  to authoritative  institutions, there
is an infinite variety of possible market solutions from which to choose
- each involving the establishment of a property rights set underlying
the bargained transactions.  In other words, government  is necessarily
involved  in setting the rules  of the  game which  in turn  give  rise to
pecuniary externalities.
4.  All externalities  are political, whether originating from public or
private  sector  actions.  All individual  and collective  action, whether
public  or private  sector  based, creates  externalities - someone's  op-
portunities are always affected, positively or negatively, by the actions
of others.
It must be recognized that "no action" is a form of action that favors
various  interests  and hurts others in the adjustment  process.  The or-
thodox  stance on pecuniary externalities  is not value  free. In the face
of pecuniary  externalities,  why  shouldn't  various  interests  work  for
collective action that enhances their position if they are organized and
powerful  enough  to cause  change? The  issue is fundamentally  one of
political  choice  and power, not of economic  efficiency  and theory. The
economist  (or anyone)  who argues  otherwise  is making a value judg-
ment and taking a political stand,  not an "objective,  scientific"  stand.
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